Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory by Mulvaney, Timothy M.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2010
Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory
Timothy M. Mulvaney
Texas A&M University School of Law, tmulvaney@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory, 24 Prob. & Prop. 11 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/353
I BymTmohy M.nMlvaL~nynnI
I U.S. Supreme Court wadedinto the waters of judicial tak-
ings last summer with a divided
opinion that effectively carries no
precedential value but is likely to have
lower courts and property scholars try-
ing to decipher its meaning for many
years to come.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), the
Court decided that some Florida gulf-
front property owners are not entitled
to compensation under the federal
Constitution's Takings Clause when a
state beach restoration project separates
their private property from the water's
edge. Although the state prevailed in
this instance, the case leaves the legal
landscape at the intersection of public
and private property rights in a haze.
This is because four Justices endorsed a
"judicial takings" theory that, mov-
ing forward, would make the Takings
Clause-"nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just
compensation"-applicable to a new,
broad set of circumstances.
The case involves a Florida law that
authorized the use of public funding
to restore sand on eroded beaches to
protect coastal property from hur-
ricanes. Fla. Stat. § 161.011-161.45
(2007). In 2003, the city of Destin and
Walton County sought permits to
add 75 feet of sand along a 6.9-mile
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shoreline. Most waterfront landowners
welcomed this complimentary shore
protection, but a small group objected
to the project on the ground that the
new beach area would be open to the
public and would redefine the bound-
ary of their property. These plaintiffs
argued that they deserved compensa-
tion because the legislation "took" their
pre-existing right to retain exclusive
ownership up to the water's edge and
also denied them their right of owner-
ship to any natural accumulations of
sand in the future.
The Florida Supreme Court held
that the landowners never had either
of these alleged rights under Florida
law and, thus, no compensation was
due. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102,
1105 (Fla. 2008). In appealing this
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the landowners modified their takings
claim. Although the Takings Clause
traditionally has been applied only to
actions by the legislative and executive
branches of government, the landown-
ers no longer focused their suit on the
Florida legislation authorizing beach
restoration or on the actions of the
state executive agency-the Florida
Department of Environmental Protec-
tion--charged with promulgating
regulations to facilitate the execution
of that legislation. Instead, they chal-
lenged the Florida court's decision by
exhuming the arguably problematic
theory that the judiciary can so signifi-
cantly reinterpret established state law
that the court's decision itself constitutes
a taking requiring compensation under
the federal Constitution.
Theory of Judicial Takings
The judicial takings doctrine on which
the property owners relied has a very
limited history. After the U.S. Supreme
Court had made veiled references to
the theory in the late 19th century (see,
e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,233-34 (1897)),
Justice Stewart discussed it in some
detail in his concurrence in Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290,294-98 (1967).
It would be almost 30 years before
another member of the Supreme Court
raised the prospect of judicial takings.
In dissenting from the denial of certio-
rari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
510 U.S. 1207 (1994), Justice Scalia,
joined only by Justice O'Connor, wrote
that the federal Takings Clause may
be implicated if a state court invokes
"nonexistent rules of state substantive
law." Relying on the premise espoused
by Justices Stewart and Scalia in these
prior cases, the plaintiffs in Stop the
Beach Renourishment claimed that the
Florida Supreme Court's declaration
that the alleged property rights never
existed was so unpredictable in light
of state precedent that they deserved
compensation.
Delving into State Property
Law: Accretion and Avulsion
These Floridian landowners, however,
failed to convince even one member of
the U.S. Supreme Court that a taking
had occurred. In a unanimous opinion,
the Court explained that all property in
Florida seaward of the Gulf of Mexico's
mean high-water line belongs to the
state, while gulf-front property own-
ers ordinarily own the land or beach
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between that line and their homes. The
Court stated that Floridian gulf-front
owners have the right to naturally
occurring, imperceptible additions of
land over time. Under this doctrine of
"accretion," the public-private prop-
erty boundary is dynamic, changing
as the beach naturally expands (or
erodes). The Court explained, how-
ever, that sudden "avulsive" events
do not change the property boundary
DESPITE THE
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in Florida. Although avulsion is most
commonly associated with hurricanes
in light of their power to rapidly
change the existing landscape, the
Court concluded that the doctrine ap-
plies even if the avulsion is caused by
the state through beach restoration or
similar projects.
By engaging in the rare task of delv-
ing deep into Florida state court prec-
edent, the U.S. Supreme Court unani-
mously found that the state retains
ownership of restored beaches, which
sit atop previously submerged, state-
owned tidelands, and need not provide
compensation to the claimant land-
owners. Specifically, the Court pointed
to a 1927 Florida case called Martin v.
Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927), which
held that the state retained ownership
to new dry land created when the state
drained a lake. The U.S. Supreme Court
found the property owners' interpreta-
tion of dicta in another prior Florida
case, Board of Trustees v. Sand Key Associ-
ates, 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987), uncon-
vincing. Although the property owners
argued for interpreting Sand Key as
entitling coastal landowners to have the
mean high-water line as their property
boundary in perpetuity, the Court
found that interpretation inconsistent
with Florida's common law doctrine of
avulsion.
Delving into the Justices'
Divergence
Despite the unanimous verdict for
the state, four members of the Court
delivered to the property rights move-
ment a conceivably groundbreaking
consolation prize. In an opinion sepa-
rate from the one to which the entire
Court acquiesced, Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Thomas, wrote in approval
of the litigants' theory by declaring the
Takings Clause applicable not only to
legislative and executive actions, but
also to judicial actions. This plurality
opinion stated, "The Takings Clause...
is not addressed to the action of a spe-
cific branch or branches. It is concerned
simply with the act, and not with the
governmental actor.... It would be
absurd to allow a State to do by judicial
decree what the Takings Clause forbids
it to do by legislative fiat." 130S. Ct. at
2601. Thus, these four Justices said that,
in future cases, a state court decision
declaring that "a well established"
property right "no longer exists" may
constitute a taking in and of itself.
The remaining four Justices in Stop
the Beach Renourishment (as explained
below, only eight participated in the
case) found the case resolvable in
favor of the state without deciding the
judicial takings issue. Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Sotomayor, asserted
that determining whether a judicial
decision declaring property owners'
rights can amount to a taking is un-
necessary so long as the Constitution's
Due Process Clause remains adequate
to protect property owners from the
judicial elimination of their existing
property rights. Justice Kennedy stated,
"[T]he Court should consider
with care the decision to extend
the Takings Clause in a manner
that might be inconsistent with
historicalpractice.... If and
when future cases show that the
usual principles... like due pro-
cess, are somehow inadequate
to protect property owners,
[only] then [would] the question
whether a judicial decision can
effect a taking... be properly
presented." Id. at 2616-17.
Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, concluded that
no taking had occurred under
any conceivable test, such that
the difficult questions surround-
ing judicial takings, or any other theory,
need not be addressed. Justice Breyer
did not respond to Justice Scalia's barb
chastising Breyer for not "grappl[ing]
with the artificial question of what
would constitute a judicial taking if
there were such a thing." Id. at 2603.
Notably, Justice Stevens removed
himself from the case, presumably
because he owns a waterfront condo-
minium in Florida. See Tony Mauro,
Was Stevens' Condo the Reason for Justice's
Recusal in Fla. Property Rights Case?,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 7, 2009. Justices need not
recuse themselves solely because they
own property in the locus of a case, and
it is unclear whether Justice Stevens
needed to do so merely because he
owns a coastal residence. Indeed, Jus-
tice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts also
own coastal land, in North Carolina
and Maine, respectively. Had all coastal
property owners on the Court recused
themselves, which likely was unneces-
sary, a 4-2 majority of the Court would
have rejected endorsing a judicial tak-
ings doctrine; had Justice Stevens par-
ticipated with the other eight Justices,
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his vote likely would have resulted
in a 5-4 rejection of the doctrine. See
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Op-Ed., Decision
in Florida Case Muddles Law on Takings,
Hous. Chron., June 22,2010.
Effects on Property
Law Litigation
Alas, the 4-4 split on judicial takings
leaves the issue unresolved, for no
opinion commanded a majority
of the Court. Still, although four
Justices' endorsement of the judi-
cial takings theory is not binding
precedent, it promises a surge of
litigation. In this litigation, it could
prove problematic that, beyond
acknowledging that no such
judicial taking transpired under
the particular facts of Stop the
Beach Renourishment, the plural-
ity opinion provides little guid-
ance on what is required to prove
that a property right actually is
"established." The category of
property laws that are not "established"
might prove empty because state courts
simply will, as Prof. Benjamin Barros
quipped, "paper up" their opinions. D.
Benjamin Barros, Supreme Court Rules in
Stop the Beach, PropertyProf Blog (June
17, 2010), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/property/2010/06/
supreme-court-rules-in-stop-the-beach.
html. Justice Scalia, however, writing
for the Court in 1987, stated that the
Takings Clause stands for "more than a
pleading requirement" and that compli-
ance with it demands "more than an
exercise in cleverness and imagination."
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825,841 (1987).
The concept of judicial takings also
raises additional practical difficulties.
Among others, three such difficulties
ostensibly contributed to the cautious
approach of Justices Kennedy, Soto-
mayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
First, assessing judicial takings
claims places federal courts in the posi-
tion of rummaging into the intricacies
of state property law, a task for which
they arguably are ill equipped. As
Justice Kennedy presaged at oral argu-
ment, courts will "have to become real
experts in Florida law" to decide the ju-
dicial takings question. Oral Argument
Transcript at 25, Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 130S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-
1151), available at www.supremecourt.
gov/oraLarguments/argument_
transcripts/08-1151.pdf. In Stop the
Beach Renourishment, the U.S. Supreme
Court did just that by focusing on
fundamental canons of Florida law sur-
rounding state sovereignty and littoral
rights. Yet whether this will become a
common practice remains uncertain. If
indeed it does, and a successful judicial
takings claim comes to pass, the Court
will have to squarely address compli-
cated questions surrounding the appro-
priate remedy, for no state judiciaries
are currently appropriating funds to
pay compensation for judicial takings.
Second, the theory of judicial takings
seemingly contradicts the prohibi-
tion on lower federal court review of
state supreme court decisions without
specific congressional authorization, set
forth in D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feld-
man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
Justice Scalia, though, suggested
that judicial takings present no such
procedural problems. He stated that
the only remedial avenue for parties
aggrieved in state supreme courts is on
certification to the U.S. Supreme Court
(the path followed by the landowners
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, but
one that is rarely available to litigants
in light of the few certification peti-
tions granted by the Court each term).
Peculiarly, however, Justice Scalia wrote
that persons that were not parties in the
original state court case could challenge
the decision in that state court case
(even possibly a decision made by a
lower state court) as a judicial taking in
the lower federal courts if that decision
affects their property value.
Third, the judicial takings theory
brings into question the very judicial
power of state courts. Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion stated that "[a] con-
ASSESSING JUDICIAL
TAKINGS CLAIMS
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stitutional provision that forbids the
uncompensated taking of property is
quite simply insusceptible of enforce-
ment by federal courts unless they
have the power to decide what prop-
erty rights exist under state law." This
seems to stand in stark contrast to the
Court's earlier prounouncement that
the states, in declaring and interpreting
their laws, serve as laboratories for the
development of innovative approaches
to modem problems. Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560,579-80 (1981), favorably
citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). State courts have long served
the role of recognizing the evolving na-
ture of property rights under common
law doctrines in the face of changing
circumstances and social values. The
constitutional hurdle created by judicial
takings certainly would compromise
the ability of state courts to make such
transitions.
Other Takings Doctrines
Implicated
Litigation in the near future will shape
the existence and scope of the judicial
takings theory supported, though not
officially endorsed, in Stop the Beach
Renourishment. But, in addition to the
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many questions raised about judicial
takings, the decision leaves other takings
issues unresolved as well. One such
issue arises from the fact that beach
renourishment projects do not merely
involve dredging sand from the ocean
bottom and placing it into near shore
waters. Instead, these projects require
that some of the dredged sand be placed
on top of existing dry land in order to
"anchor" the new beach into place.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), declared that
any physical occupation of private
property, however de minimis, is a per
se taking that requires compensation. (In
Loretto, the Court held that an ordinance
requiring apartment owners to allow
cable companies to install a cable wire
along the outside of their buildings
amounted to a per se taking.) Does a
government act that requires the place-
ment of anchoring sand on a small piece
of dry private property to protect the
remainder of that property run afoul of
Loretto's "automatic" taking rule when
that anchoring sand is open to the
public?
Normatively, it is easy enough to
suggest that it should not-the effect
on the landowners' value and use of
their property is negligible because the
land on which the new sand is placed
would succumb to the sea in short
order without the beach restoration
project. Doctrinally, however, it may be
difficult to conclude otherwise given
Loretto's formalism. This divergence
between norm and doctrine raises the
specter of whether Loretto and other
formal categories of automatic takings
that have followed (and even derived
from) it should be reconsidered in light
of their inflexibility.
Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decision in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment may raise more questions than it
answers in the field of takings jurispru-
dence. In light of the many unsettled
issues outlined above, some might
suggest that the creation of a judicial
takings doctrine, as well as any expan-
sion of or even continued reliance on
per se takings rules, is imprudent. In its
first modem regulatory takings deci-
sion in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Court
identified several factors as relevant in
attempting to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between public and private rights
in individual takings cases. Today, t is
case-by-case balancing approach serves
as the principal tak igs test when per
se (and now possibly judicial takings)
rules do not apply. It is possible that
refinement of the Penn Central factors-
reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions, economic effect, and character
of the government action-rather than
judicial takings and per se rules, could
serve as a preferred approach toward a
takings framework that best deals with
legal transitions needed in a changing
world. U
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